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Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat. By Geoffrey Hayes 
and Mark Sedra, editors. Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier 
 University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-1-55458-001-8. Notes. 
 Bibliography. Charts. Index. Pp. xxxiv, 309. Paper, $29.95.
as this review is being written, President obama has just concluded a 
meeting with canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper at which one 
of the primary topics of discussion was the “deteriorating situation” in 
afghanistan. obama recently ordered another 17,000 u.S. troops to that 
troubled nation, and while Harper remains committed to his country’s 
pledge to help rebuild afghanistan, canada looks to withdraw its nearly 
3000 troops by 2011. it remains to be seen whether afghans can regain 
control of their country’s security situation, but given the increasing 
instability and a resurgent taliban and al-Qaeda efforts, it seems likely 
that additional u.S. troops will be needed to prevail on what obama has 
termed the main front in the war on terrorism. if nothing else, canada’s 
economic assistance will be vital, but the current uncertain conditions 
highlight the importance of understanding why we are facing a “transition 
under threat,” as the editors have aptly subtitled this timely volume.
Hayes and Sedra have done good service in bringing together in one 
volume a collection of eleven papers presented in Waterloo,  canada 
in December 2006, at a workshop sponsored by the centre for 
 international governance innovation and co-organized by the laurier 
centre for  Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies. the collected 
essays  address three distinct, yet interrelated, aspects of afghanistan’s 
 transition from war to peace and are organized under the headings of 
“Political  transition,” “economic transition,” and “Security transition.” 
a final section of three essays under the category of “the canadian case,” 
 specifically examines canada’s experience in afghanistan. Despite the 
recent attention on the state of afghan affairs, it was apparent to these 
scholars and other experts even in 2006 that the situation there was yet 
so uncertain as to give rise to questions about whether efforts to bring 
stability were “gaining ground or were on the verge of ‘strategic  failure’ ” 
(p. vii). a sense of the authors’ collective foreboding that the latter 
 situation was the most likely outcome provides a somber background for 
these essays.
an insightful look at the legacy of 2001’s Bonn conference and  resultant 
agreement provide the foundation for a discussion of the political 
 transition. in “looking Back at the Bonn Process,” William Maley cites 
two significant factors as contributing to the failure to deliver fully on 
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the promises of Bonn. one is Pakistan’s penchant for interference in 
afghan affairs, and the other is the relegation of afghanistan to a back 
seat in  favor of iraq, to which resources and attention have been largely 
 diverted. Maley further cites as critical the initial decision not to expand 
the international Security assistance force (iSaf) beyond Kabul, a 
 situation that contributed significantly to disorder in outlying areas of  
the country.
in “afghanistan: the challenge of State Building,” former afghan 
 interior Minister ali a. Jalali also blames the legacy of corruption in his 
country for the failure to provide a suitable foundation for the growth of 
democracy. the afghan state clearly was unable to provide the most basic 
public services, most notably, security. Jonathan goodhand rounds out 
the discussion of the political transition with a provocative look at how 
poppy production plays a central role in security affairs, asserting that 
drug policies are actually “undermining higher policy goals related to 
security and governance” (74). goodhand echoes Jalali’s lament over the 
lack of focus on strengthening “core state institutions,” and in a plea 
to reconsider intensive eradication efforts he concludes that “rather 
than criminalizing war economies there is a need to think more  
carefully about how to harness the energies of war in order to pay for 
peace” (77).
Perhaps of most interest to the readers of this review will be the  section 
of the book dealing with the security transition. antonio  giustozzi’s 
“the neo-taliban insurgency: from Village islam to  international 
Jihad,” insightfully contends that a new taliban  strategy has emerged 
that  emphasizes building support among Muslim  nations and 
 stretching Western capabilities by creating multiple areas of  unrest 
around the world. rather than turning Westerners’ public  opinion 
against their countries’ military efforts, neo-taliban focus is on 
 winning  Muslim  public opinion and thereby strengthening sources of 
 funding and  volunteers. inside afghanistan, that means first removing 
 pro-government forces from the fight, thus promoting the image from 
that point that the taliban is waging a war against foreign aggressors.
in Mark Sedra’s “Security Sector reform and State Building in 
 afghanistan,” the author reflects on the state of security sector reform 
(SSr), noting that the process of remaking afghanistan’s state security 
architecture “continues to be characterized by short-termism” (212) and 
a failure to balance long and short-term goals. Moreover, he asserts, 
pumping funds into unreformed state institutions still ripe for corruption 
will serve only to further alienate afghans victimized by that corruption. 
Sedra recommends adoption of “a holistic approach that aims to change 
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the culture and ethos of the system,” (213) and hopes for a continuation 
of the momentum in placing SSr efforts on the right course for success.
afghan ambassador to the united States, Husain Haqqani’s article, 
 “insecurity along the Durand line,” provides an historical primer 
 describing the creation of afghanistan’s border first with British india 
and then with the independent state of Pakistan, tracing the process by 
which the latter developed relations with the united States by  portraying 
itself as the bulwark against Soviet influence in the region and by 
 maintaining influence in afghanistan. While interesting in its portrayal 
of afghanistan’s views on the historical relations between that country 
and Pakistan, Haqqani’s version, though useful, seems decidedly partial 
in fixing blame. He contends that Pakistan’s historical fears of insecurity 
on its borders still influence afghanistan’s external relations and must 
be addressed by the international community before stable and cordial 
 relations can exist between the two neighbors.
in all, this fine collection of essays provides a useful look at where 
we have been and, unfortunately, where we still need to go in efforts 
to  restore the security of afghanistan. the book will be of interest to 
 scholars and strategic security practitioners alike.
Edward J. Hagerty is the provost at Henley-Putnam University.
Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American 
 National Security. By Richard K. Betts. New York, NY:  
Columbia University Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-231-13889-5. 
Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 241. $21.50.
We are all aware that the events of September 11, 2001 brought intense 
focus on our nation’s intelligence community (ic), with an enormous 
variety of corrections, reorganizations, and improvements proposed, 
many of which were implemented. at the same time allegations of 
 serious error, incorrect reporting, and excessive compartmentation 
drew  front-page headlines in u.S. newspapers and television news 
programs. in Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American 
National Security, richard Betts explores these issues and looks at the 
changes that have resulted, while providing significant background and 
 interesting evaluations of the products of those changes. He also offers 
his perspective of possible solutions to problems, including strategies to 
enhance the effectiveness of intelligence analysis and reporting.
While the intelligence business is itself based on a history of many 
centuries—even the ancient romans and greeks used intelligence to 
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their advantage and sometimes to their disadvantage—Betts focuses on 
the events of the past several decades to illustrate his points, generally 
from World War ii to the present day. in this respect the book could 
be  considered a commentary, or perhaps a set of proposed solutions to 
 complex problems that are faced in today’s world. He does this based 
on a distinctive association with the ic. currently he is Director of the 
arnold a. Salzman institute of War and Peace Studies at columbia 
university, and senior fellow at the council of foreign relations. Betts is 
also the author of several books on military strategy and foreign policy. 
He has served on staffs of the Senate intelligence committee (the church 
committee) and national Security council in the 1970s, as a consultant 
to the national intelligence council and the central intelligence agency 
in the 1980s, on advisory panels for the Director of central intelligence 
in the 1990s, and on the national commission on terrorism (the Bremer 
commission) in 1999–2000.
certainly this book is not unique in the field of reviews of our current 
ic. the thirty-four pages of notes with footnoted references are enough 
to demonstrate the number of publications on this subject. indeed, 
these references are really a treasure trove of materials pertinent to this 
 complex topic, and they provide the basis for a thorough evaluation of 
many of the concepts. Betts draws from this vast set of publications in 
order to provide his own perspective regarding the intelligence processes 
and structure.
Betts skillfully uses his academic experience in combination with his 
on-the-job experience in order to define many of the problems the 
ic has faced in the past and those that continue to be of  fundamental 
 importance. He clearly points out that public criticism of the ic is often 
based on limited or even incorrect information. Many successes go 
 quietly into the unknown, while failures most often become public. He 
also points out that sometimes it is difficult to clearly determine the 
degree of success of an operation, particularly if it preempts an enemy 
 action. for example, if we learn through intelligence that an enemy  action 
is forthcoming we might implement a defensive measure. if the enemy 
in turn realizes that a defensive measure exists and does not  pursue the 
action, it is difficult to recognize the degree of success.  Similarly, if there 
is insufficient real proof that an enemy action might take place, but the 
implementation of an appropriate defense is too expensive or complex 
based on the evidence available, a lack of action on our part would reflect 
badly on the  intelligence process if the enemy action actually occurred. 
as noted on the book jacket, author unknown, “Betts argues that when 
it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on 
consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between 
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conflicting requirements. He also emphasizes the substantial success of 
the intelligence community, despite its well-publicized blunders, and 
highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and 
protection.”
i must admit that when i read of his activities with the church 
 commission, which was extremely critical of the intelligence  community 
in the 1970s, his academic experience and work with the  Brookings 
 institution, both generally liberal environments, i did not expect to 
find supportable conclusions. in fact i found that he clearly  expressed 
real problems in both the intelligence and political worlds, and 
made  proposals that can positively affect not only the collection and 
 reporting of intelligence, but the evaluation and analysis followed by 
the  determination of appropriate actions based on the intelligence. 
 anyone involved in final intelligence product analysis or  implementation 
of responses to threats should read this book and consider using the 
 approaches offered by richard Betts.
Ed Urie is a member of the Henley-Putnam University faculty and is 
also an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He is a retired 
U.S. Army Intelligence Officer and a veteran of CIA and NSA.
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